This year is expected to mark a significant milestone for the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL). On
February 12, the Chief of Naval Staff (KASAL), Admiral Muhammad Ali, announced that the
aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi would be delivered from Italy ahead of the anniversary of the
Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) on October 5, 2026. The aircraft carrier not only serves
as a symbol of prestige and the pride of the navy, but also a willingness to test the upper
bounds of Indonesia’s naval ambition beyond its littoral sphere. Moreover, the second
Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel (PPA) frigate, KRI Prabu Siliwangi, is also on track for
delivery. Departing from the La Spezia Naval Base in February, the ship has been on a long
voyage, visiting various ports and conducting naval diplomacy before arriving in September in
Indonesia.
While it’s true that TNI AL still lacked an adequate number of hulls, compensating for the
quantity alone doesn’t guarantee the desired capability, let alone effectiveness. This is an
important lesson learned from the Iranian Navy and its Revolutionary Guard counterpart. On
March 11, the Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper,
claimed that the US had taken out more than 60 Iranian ships during 10 days of Operation Epic
Fury- equal to 90% of the Iranian Navy’s inventory[1]. Among the ships sunk, IRIS Makran and
IRIS Shahid Bagheri are the most notable due to their role as light aircraft carriers for launching
drones.
Indeed, there is no way the Iranian navy is on par with US forces. Only belatedly, in the past
decade, has Tehran begun to place greater emphasis on developing its naval posture. This was
marked by the introduction of locally built frigates and corvettes, as well as the conversion of a
commercial tanker into a makeshift aircraft carrier. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Guard
Navy has been focused on building asymmetrical capabilities to counter much superior forces.

These include utilising kamikaze boats, mines, drones, and missiles, which were dispersed
around the Persian Gulf.
While there are inherent differences between the TNI AL and the Iranian Navy, this should not
lead to complacency. Ignoring valuable lessons learned from the Iranian Navy risks a similar
calamity for TNI AL in the future. The Iranian navy, in particular, and its defensive posture in
general, have failed to prevent US and Israeli air control over its airspace. During the war, the US
and Israelis aircraft have been operating with impunity and freedom over the Iranian airspace.
This indicated the attainment of a high degree of air control, whether in the form of air
superiority or air supremacy.
The failure partly stems from Tehran’s overt reliance on ground-based, fixed air defence
systems[1]. Such a system has proven to be prone to ground sabotage operations. Israel, for
instance, has deployed special operations troops to intercept and destroy the missile system on
the ground by employing anti-tank guided missiles and small drones. While some systems, such
as S-300 and Tor as well as locally made Bavar-373 and Raad, are designed to be mobile,
satellite imagery suggests they’re rarely repositioned from their fixed bases—even after being
attacked last year. This, in turn, makes the job of adversary sabotage or strike units significantly
easier. Moreover, Iran’s layered missile defence system—which operates US, Russian, and locally
made systems—appears not so integrated. Leaving them essentially alone against a complex
multi-domain air, ground, electronic, and cyber SEAD/DEAD operations.
For its part, the Iranian Navy maintains a modest air defence system. On paper, the Jamaran
class frigate and Shahid Soleimani corvette possess Sayyad-2 medium range missile defence
system, a copy of the US RIM-66 Talon. But such capabilities are unevenly distributed across the
fleet. Many vessels are left equipped only with anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS—an
arrangement strikingly like that of many ships in the TNI AL[2]. The resulting fate is predictable.
Once the ground-based system is degraded or suppressed, the fleet becomes significantly
exposed to air attacks, while the onboard system offers little to no protection.
Iranian asymmetric capability might survive the enemy’s airstrike, but its operation has been
hampered. The US and its allies’ forces continue to snatch these asymmetric crawlers, albeit
burning through years of magazine stockpiles. Iran has launched approximately 2,500 drones
and 1,100 missiles, with 90-95% of them being intercepted. Simultaneously, US and Israelis
aircraft further intensify the airstrike, targeting the launchers and storage to further degrade
Iran’s strike capability. Some might argue that the war has turned into attritional warfare. But
even asymmetric or attritional warfare suffers when defensive posture fails. Ukraine serves as
an example of a successful asymmetric force to contain the Russian Black Sea Fleet, in part due
to its ability to deny the freedom of the Russian Aerospace Force (VKS)[3].